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Rapid advances in machine learning (ML) 
are poised to generate significant economic 
value and transform numerous occupations 
and industries. Machine learning, as described 
in Brynjolfsson and Mitchell (2017), is a sub-
field of artificial intelligence (AI) that studies 
the question “How can we build computer 
programs that automatically improve their per-
formance at some task through experience?” 
We believe it is also a “general purpose tech-
nology” (GPT), a technology that becomes 
pervasive, improves over time, and generates 
complementary innovation (Bresnahan and 
Trajtenberg 1995).
Recent rapid progress in ML has been driven 
largely by an approach called deep learning, 
and has made it possible for machines to match 
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or surpass humans in certain types of tasks, 
 especially those involving image and speech 
recognition, natural language processing, and 
predictive analytics. So far, the realized eco-
nomic effects are small relative to the potential 
offered by this new GPT (Brynjolfsson, Rock, 
and Syverson 2017). This reflects the time lags 
of years or even decades before GPTs generate 
substantial economic value. Entrepreneurs and 
innovators take time to adopt new technologies, 
reconfigure existing work, discover new busi-
ness processes, and  co-invent complementary 
technologies (Bresnahan and Greenstein 1996). 
Reorganization of economic activity is an import-
ant determinant of the returns to innovation.
Concern about the coming wave of automa-
tion’s impact on employment is growing. For 
instance, Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017) con-
nect the adoption of robots to reduced employ-
ment and wages in local labor markets. A study 
by the McKinsey Global Institute suggested 
that about half of the work activities people per-
form could be automated with current technol-
ogy (Manyika et al. 2017). While advances in 
ML are impressive, and automation is already 
having significant effects on many parts of the 
workforce, we are far from artificial general 
intelligence (AGI) which would match humans 
in all cognitive areas. This raises the question 
of which tasks will be most affected by ML and 
which will be relatively unaffected.
In particular, a key insight of Autor, Levy, 
and Murnane (2003) is that an occupation can 
be viewed as a bundle of tasks, some of which 
offer better applications for technology than 
others. As with studies of routine task auto-
mation, the impact of machine learning on 
employment is a function of the suitability of 
machine learning for specific work activities.
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Furthermore, as noted by Levy (2017), the 
differential effectiveness of ML in different 
tasks suggests that the impact of ML diffusion 
will be uneven across occupations.
We first examine the channels by which 
ML can affect the workforce. Next, we apply 
Brynjolfsson and Mitchell’s (2017) rubric for 
evaluating the potential for applying machine 
learning to tasks to the 2,069 work activi-
ties, 18,156 tasks, and 964 occupations in the 
O*NET database. From this, we build measures 
of what we call “suitability for machine learn-
ing” (SML) for labor inputs in the US economy. 
We then discuss measures of the potential for 
reorganization.
In the case of ML, we find that (i) most occu-
pations in most industries have at least some 
tasks that are SML; (ii) few if any occupations 
have all tasks that are SML; and (iii) unleashing 
ML potential will require significant redesign of 
the task content of jobs, as SML and  non-SML 
tasks within occupations are unbundled and 
rebundled.
Our findings suggest that a shift is needed in 
the debate about the effects of AI on work: away 
from the common focus on full automation of 
many jobs and pervasive occupational replace-
ment toward the redesign of jobs and reengi-
neering of business processes. Our evidence 
suggests that ML technologies will indeed be 
pervasive, but that within jobs, the SML of work 
tasks varies greatly. We suggest that variability 
in  task-level SML is an indicator for the poten-
tial reorganization of a job, as the high and low 
SML tasks within a job can be separated and 
 re-bundled. The focus of researchers, as well 
as managers and entrepreneurs, should be not (just) on automation, but on job redesign.
I. Machine Learning and Task Automation
Most of the recent progress in ML perfor-
mance has been made by a specific class of 
algorithms called deep neural networks, or more 
generally, deep learning systems.1 Although 
the basic structure of some of these models 
is decades old, significant new algorithmic 
advances have also been made. Interest and 
progress have reignited as computational costs 
1 The AI Index Report at http://cdn.aiindex.org/ 2017-
report.pdf contains a series of benchmarks. 
in model training have fallen dramatically with 
improving hardware and new architectures.2
Past automation using explicit rules or man-
ually written computer algorithms to automate 
tasks has had a significant impact on produc-
tivity and the workforce (Acemoglu and Autor 
2011; Autor and Dorn 2013; Autor, Levy, and 
Murnane 2003). However, applications were 
limited to areas where knowledge was codi-
fied, or at least codifiable, because of Polanyi’s 
Paradox (Polanyi 1966)—the fact that we “know 
more than we can tell.” ML models circumvent 
Polanyi’s Paradox by inferring the mapping 
function between inputs and outputs (in the case 
of supervised learning) automatically. While 
not always interpretable or explainable, these 
ML models open up a new set of possibilities 
for automation and complementarities to labor (Autor 2014). The types of tasks affected by ML 
will be quite different from those affected in past 
waves of automation.
Because of their capacity to learn highly non-
linear functions with  near-automatic input space 
transformations, deep neural nets (DNNs) are 
currently the algorithms with some of the most 
obvious economic potential at the automation 
frontier. DNN software can be extended to new 
domains formerly closed to digitization by the 
high cost or impossibility of writing explicit 
maps of inputs to outputs and policies.
Suboptimal bundling of tasks in jobs can 
block potential productivity gains from ML. 
Consider the case of Leontief production, where 
all task inputs are complements such that pro-
duction possibilities are constrained by the min-
imum of inputs. Bundling SML and  non-SML 
tasks prevents specialization and locks up poten-
tial productivity gains. If the cost of ML capital (and SML task wage) were zero, workers would 
prefer to switch to tasks that ML cannot do. If 
firms only offer labor contracts that have a preset 
mixture of SML and  non-SML tasks, all of the 
labor effort put toward SML tasks has an output 
opportunity cost increasing in efficiency units of 
forgone potential  non-SML labor. ML could be 
doing those tasks, and the firm could increase 
profit if it were to reorganize job bundles.
One criterion for whether a task is SML is that 
the set of actions and the corresponding set of 
2 See LeCun, Bengio, and Hinton (2015) for a review of 
deep learning technologies and their history. 
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outputs for the task can be measured sufficiently 
well that a machine can learn the mapping 
between the two sets. If ML substitutes for the 
tasks which produce the least noisy performance 
signals, then rebundling residual tasks in new 
jobs transfers risk from the firm to its workers.3 
Under a model of hidden action as in Holmström 
and Milgrom (1991), this will affect job design, 
compensation, and organization of work.4
II. What Can Machines Learn?
Successful application of machine learning 
is contingent on a variety of task characteristics 
and contextual factors of work activities. We use 
the O*NET content model for 964 occupations 
in the US economy joined to 18,156 specific 
tasks at the occupation level, which are further 
mapped to 2,069 direct work activities (DWAs) 
shared across occupations. We score each 
DWA for its Suitability for ML using a slightly 
extended version of the task evaluation rubric in 
Brynjolfsson and Mitchell (2017). The rubric 
we apply has 23 distinct statements to be eval-
uated on a  5-point scale varying from “strongly 
disagree” to “strongly agree.”5
While we find it daunting to try to imagine 
all the ways a task could be automated—match-
ing wits with the collective ingenuity of all 
the world’s entrepreneurs—the scope of tasks 
that are SML, as ML currently exists, is much 
more constrained and definable. Evaluating 
worker activities with the rubric has the benefit 
of focusing on what ML can do and avoiding 
grouping all forms of automation together. The 
rubric is applied to each DWA to generate ini-
tial SML scores using CrowdFlower, a human 
3 Performance measurement is directly related to the 
industrial potential for reinforcement learning algorithms as 
well. For instance, researchers at Google DeepMind report 
that they have implemented a neural net system that reduced 
cooling costs by 40 percent compared to the same data cen-
ter when it was optimized by their human engineers (see 
https://deepmind.com/blog/ deepmind-ai-reduces-google-
data-centre-cooling-bill-40/).
4 For instance, workers may need to be compensated 
for taking on bundles of tasks with noisier average perfor-
mance when machines handle measurable tasks. This has the 
implication that over time worker performance will become 
harder to evaluate since the most measurable tasks tend to be 
the most suitable for ML. Brynjolfsson, Mitchell, and Rock 
(2018) has more detail on this point. 
5 Rubric details are available in the supplementary 
materials. 
intelligence task crowdsourcing platform.6 High 
values of SML offer an indication of where ML 
might have the greatest potential to transform a 
job.
There are a number of important conceptual 
caveats to this application of the SML rubric. 
The rubric focuses on technical feasibility. It 
is silent on the economic, organizational, legal, 
cultural, and societal factors influencing ML 
adoption. Additionally, we are focused on rel-
atively  near-term opportunities.7 Matching the 
evolving state of the art in ML in the future will 
require updating the rubric accordingly.
Table 1 summarizes the SML measures for 
occupations, tasks, and activities. Table 2 pres-
ents the occupations with the five highest and 
five lowest values for SML. In addition, read-
ers may be interested to know that occupation 
“economist” scores close to average (SML of 
3.46). The variance of occupation-level SML is 
considerably lower than that of the tasks. As one 
would expect, job bundling of tasks provides 
some diversification with respect to machine 
learning exposure. Figure 1 shows counts of 
occupation-level proportions of tasks above the 
fiftieth, seventy-fifth, and ninetieth percentile for 
SML. Many occupations have several high SML 
tasks bundled with low SML tasks.
The  within-occupation standard deviation of 
task SML scores is 0.596 (17.2 percent of the 
mean SML score of 3.466), revealing a high 
6 The supplementary materials detail how the raw 
CrowdFlower dataset is built and processed. This dataset is 
sourced from our companion paper (Brynjolfsson, Mitchell, 
and Rock 2018). In addition to our measures included here 
(based on averages of median ratings of activities), we also 
evaluate more complex boolean combinations of the scores 
in the companion paper. 
7 For example, we have considered extensive physical 
activity a challenge for implementation of machine learning. 
Table 1—Suitability for Machine Learning: Summary 
Statistics
Occupations Tasks DWAs
Mean SML 3.47 3.47 3.47
SD of SML 0.11 0.31 0.32
Minimum SML 2.78 2.38 2.38
25th percentile SML 3.40 3.25 3.25
75th percentile SML 3.50 3.68 3.70
Max SML 3.90 4.48 4.48
Count 966 19,612 2.069
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level of variability for the potential of machine 
learning within jobs. Jobs with higher scores 
in “sdSML” ( within-occupation standard 
deviation of SML) have higher potential for 
reorganization.
Machine learning is a very different tech-
nology from earlier types of automation and 
it affects a very different set of tasks. While 
the last waves of automation lead to increase 
inequality and wage polarization as routine cog-
nitive tasks were automated (Autor and Dorn 
2013) it’s not clear that ML will have the same 
effects. The correlation coefficients of SML 
with (log median) wage percentile and wage bill (BLS employment times wage) percentiles are 
very low: −0.14 and 0.10, respectively.
Furthermore, for sdSML, the correlation coef-
ficients with wage and total wage bill percen-
tiles are 0.17 and 0.002. This suggests that the 
next wave of automation and reengineering may 
affect a different part of the labor force than the 
last one. However, it’s important to note that the 
ex ante potential of ML may differ from its ulti-
mate implementation, as other factors come to 
bear. 
Even though SML correlation with wage 
and total wage expenditure percentiles is low, 
the actual implementation of ML technologies 
by managers and integrators may not follow 
the SML rankings. If technological change is 
directed, the implementation of ML by man-
agers and entrepreneurs will be focused on the 
high wage bill tasks with higher SML. 
III. Conclusion
Automation technologies have historically 
been the key driver of increased industrial pro-
ductivity. They have also disrupted employment 
and the wage structure systematically. However, 
our analysis suggests that ML will affect very 
Figure 2.  Task-Level SML with Occupation versus 
Occupational Wage and Wage Bill Percentile 
(BLS 2016)
Note: Tasks are weighted by importance from the O*NET 
database.
Table 2—Lowest and Highest 5 SML Score 
Occupations
Low SML occupations SML High SML occupations SML
Massage therapists 2.78 Concierges 3.9
Animal scientists 3.09 Mechanical drafters 3.9
Archeologists 3.11 Morticians, undertakers,
 and funeral directors
3.89
Public address system
 and other announcers
3.13 Credit authorizers 3.78
Plasterers and stucco
 masons
3.14 Brokerage clerks 3.78
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Figure 1. Frequency Counts of Occupational Task 
Proportions Above Ninetieth, Seventy-fifth, and 
Fiftieth Percentiles
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different parts of the workforce than earlier 
waves of automation. Furthermore, tasks within 
jobs typically show considerable variability 
in SML, while few (if any) jobs can be fully 
automated using ML. Machine learning tech-
nology can transform many jobs in the econ-
omy, but full automation will be less significant 
than the reengineering of processes and the 
 reorganization of tasks.8
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